The following steps illustrate the requirements to raise and vote on a proposal in the scenario where only vesting GRO counts towards votes. When on-chain governance cannot be used to implement the resulting actions (either because on-chain governance is not approved by the DAO or because the respective proposal would not result in an on-chain action), the off-chain governance process result (though technically non-binding) is considered as the final vote:

1. Discuss in Discord at #governance channel

2. Write a Gro Request For Comments (GRFC) on Gro DAO Forum, following these guidelines on writing GRFCs, and use the poll feature to conduct an informal signalling vote

3. After at least [6 days]* of GRFC, if feedback has been implemented and there is a general consensus (as determined by GRFC feedback and by at least [15 members] participating in a passing signalling vote) that the proposal should be taken to vote, addresses with [175,000+ vesting or delegated* vesting GRO tokens]** (~0.5% of current*** GRO Supply*),* or whitelisted**** addresses; can initiate the proposal on Gro DAO’s Snapshot, using this Proposal Description Template

4. The vote would be live for at least [5 days]* for off-chain voting on Snapshot, and would need to meet a quorum of [350,000 vesting GRO]* (~1% of current*** GRO Supply) and a passing rate of over [50%*]

5. A successful vote would have [3 days]* of timelock for implementation (if applicable), allowing time for emergency multi-sig to act if there’s a malicious attack

CAVEATS:

*Parameters:

• Proposal threshold, quorum, timelock, voting period, and voting delay:
  • Are aligned with those set by similar-sized DAOs (e.g. Inverse DAO, Origin DAO, Idle DAO, Angle, Lido, Aave) and protocols (as defined by market cap, treasury size, TVL) that use a vesting-governance model
  • Take into consideration current voter participation rates within Gro DAO and distribution of GRO tokens
  • Have been proposed to balance safety and security, with greater autonomy
  • Follow Tally’s guidance on parameters for balancing between ease of passing proposals and security against malicious proposals

• As more GRO tokens get distributed and the current GRO supply increases, the absolute parameter values will need to be updated over time.
• The parameters for off-chain votes are lower than those for on-chain votes, as by definition, these cannot be used to conduct a significant governance attack.

**Delegation:

• It is proposed that voters can delegate their votes to others in order to more easily meet the aforementioned parameters. By aggregating GRO tokens together through delegation contracts, it becomes more feasible, for example, that someone else other than core team members can initiate a proposal. Additionally, it would give voters the chance to delegate to an informed and competent representative (where helpful), to increase total voter participation and allow voters to avoid paying gas fees (by sending signatures to a delegate who then executes the aggregated on-chain vote, if applicable). Guidance on how to delegate governance tokens to an address, can be found here.
• Delegation can be conducted either on Snapshot or through a delegator smart contract function (which is the more ideal scenario)

***Current Supply of GRO Tokens